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The comparisons of uncertainty calculi from the last two Uncertainty 
Workshops have all used theoretical probabilistic accuracy as the sole metric. 
While mathematical correctness is important, there are other factors which 
should be considered when developing reasoning systems. These other fac­
tors include, among other things, the error in uncertainty measures obtain­
able for the problem and the effect of this error on the performance of the 
resulting system. 
There are some domains in which many of the interesting conditional 
probabilities can be objectively estimated. For example, census data allows 
various characterizations of individuals with a reasonable degree of confi­
dence. Where information is missing, then a theoretically plausible method, 
such as maximum entropy assignment, may be used (Cheeseman, 1983). 
The typical application domain for artificial intelligence does not have 
known or accessible objective probabilities. Artificial intelligence systems 
are being built using knowledge from experts whose knowledge is limited to 
repeated experience or understanding of major causal factors. Human esti­
mates of probability are known to be biased in several different ways 
(Edwards, 1971; Fischhoff & Bayth-Marom, 1983; Kahneman & Tversky, 1972; 
Schum, Du Charme, & DePitts, 1973; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). The lack of 
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access to accurate objective probabilities leads to the question of how each 
theory's evidence aggregation technique compound these errors. 
Buchanan and Shortliffe (1984) faced this problem of balancing theoreti­
cal correctness with domain-specific effectiveness. Because of their experts' 
difficulties in rationally expressing their knowledge as probabilities, the au­
thors chose an alternative, supposedly more intuitive, evidential metric. 
Using this metric, they built an effective decision system. Regardless of the 
success or failure of this and other alternative approaches, it is not known 
whether using better formulated probabilistic approaches would have per­
formed better or worse. It is possible that the probabilities which the experts 
were uncomfortable in estimating would have led to better system perfor­
mance than the comfortable but poorly understood certainty factors. 
We conducted an experiment to address this question empirically. In 
this study, many "expert systems" were created for the same, very simple, 
problem domain. Each system used a different human expert's judgments 
and one of three uncertainty representation/aggregation techniques: classical 
Bayesian, Mycin's certainty factors (Buchanan & Shortliffe, 1984), and 
Dempster-Shafer (Shafer, 1976) theory. These three were chosen as represen­
tative of currently popular methodologies. 
The following characteristics were used to design the experiment. First, 
the three methodologies require that the relevant relations in the domain of 
expertise be stochastic. Second, the experts had to be comparable in their 
ability to solve domain problems in order for observed differences to be at­
tributed to differences in the reasoning methodologies. Finally, the actual 
relations between the evidence and conclusions had to be under experimen­
tal control in order to assess the expert systems' accuracies. 
Only a highly synthetic domain could satisfy these requirements. We 
created such a domain and provided extensive controlled experience with it 
to human experimental subjects. To ensure that the experience would lead 
to expertise, the domain was kept rather simple; nonetheless, it resembles, in 
a nontrivial way, the sort of classification task that many expert systems are 
asked to perform. The subjects predicted the color of blocks based on ob­
served shapes. The experimenter controlled both the conditional probabili­
ties of color given shape and the relative frequencies of different block 
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shapes. This relation is given in Table 1 The relation makes some pieces of 
evidence (e.g. circles) highly diagnostic while others are worthless (e.g. trian­
gles). 
Table 1 
Shape Experiment 
Number of blocks of each color and shape 
Green Red Gold Total 
Square 0 48 24 72 
Circle 96 16 32 144 
Triangle 36 36 36 108 
Total 132 100 92 324 
The 54 subjects of our study, college students, were required to learn 
through experience the relation between shape and color. On each of 324 
trials, a block was sampled with replacement from the probability distribu­
tions. The subjects were shown the block's shape and asked to predict its 
color. They had to continue guessing until they guessed the correct color. 
At first their guesses were un-informed; however, as their experience in­
creased, they became more knowledgeable and better able to guess. 
The subjects also had to learn how to express their knowledge in terms 
appropriate to the uncertainty representation used by the system to which 
they were assigned (Bayesian, Certainty factors, or Dempster-Shafer). 
Eighteen subjects were assigned to each group. Prior to their exposure to the 
colored blocks, subjects were given an extensive briefing on how to estimate 
the appropriate uncertainty parameters. They generated estimates for two 
domains in which we assumed they had prior experience: the relation be­
tween home town and Superbowl viewing, and the relation between eco­
nomic class and political party affiliation. While learning the colored blocks 
relation, subjects were asked to make uncertainty parameter estimates at 
four equally spaced intervals -- i.e., after every 81 trials. 
There are many ways to attain the appropriate evidence metrics for each 
theory. The experiment could not compare each of these methods. Instead, 
one method was chosen for each of the theories. For the Bayesian metric, 
the subjects were asked to estimate the a priori probability of each conclu-
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sion (e.g., what fraction of blocks were red) and the conditional probability of 
each evidence value given each conclusion (e.g., what fraction of red blocks 
were square) .. For the Mycin metric, the subjects were asked to provide a 
measure of belief change between -1 and +1 for each conclusion given each 
evidence value (e.g., what change in belief for red knowing the block is 
square). For the Dempster-Shafer metric, the subjects were asked to estimate 
a lower and upper bound on the probability of each conclusion given each 
evidence value (e.g., what fraction of square blocks were red). 
Results 
The first result of interest is whether the subjects became experts. Each 
training trial consisted of a shape being shown to the subject and the subject 
guessing the color until they guessed correctly. At first, the subjects per­
formed no better than chance. On the last 81 trials, however, on those shapes 
which were diagnostic of color, the subjects performed significantly better 
than chance, F(2,34) = 157.04,12 < .00005. Table 2 shows the group means and 
variances. The difference from chance is large enough to consider the sub­
jects expert. 
Table 2 
Shape Experiment 
Average number of guesses per trial on the last set 
Bayes Dempster Mycin 
shape f..L (T f..L (T f..L (T 
Square 1.47 0.163 1.42 0.177 1.44 0.188 
Circle 154 0.139 152 0.141 152 0.120 
Triangle 2.06 0.152 2.00 0.178 1.97 0.159 
J..L=mean 
cr =standard deviation 
Optimal 
1.33 
1.44 
2.00 
A second result of interest is whether there were any differences in the 
number of guesses required for subjects assigned to the different evidence 
aggregation techniques. Subjects in the different groups experienced the 
same shape-color sequences; only their uncertainty parameter reporting in­
structions differed. Not surprisingly, no significant difference in guessing 
ability was observed, E(2,34) = 2.04, R > .14. This lack of difference allows 
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comparison of the uncertainty parameter estimates because the parameters 
were obtained from roughly equivalent experts. 
Three different methods of comparing knowledge transfer responses 
were examined. Each method used the performance of expert systems de­
rived from each subject's responses. Briefly, the overall observation from this 
data is that there were only minor differences in the effectiveness of the dif­
ferent systems. Each comparison will be discussed below. 
The first comparison method involved asking each expert system the ex­
haustive set of questions of the form, "If evidence i is present, is conclusion! 
more likely than conclusion y_?' All relevant pair-wise ordinal comparisons 
were examined. The number of incorrectly ordered pairs measures the in­
ability of each system to discern the conditions which order the likelihoods 
of the different conclusions. The incorrect responses were totaled. 
After the first 81 training trials (the lowest level of learning), the Mycin 
subjects' responses led to the most accuracy in this task. The Mycin systems 
answered 85% of these questions correctly while the Dempster-Shafer sys­
tems scored 75% and the Bayesian systems scored 70%. This difference was 
significant and represents possible differences in novices' or intermediate 
experts' knowledge transfer accuracy. 
After all 324 training trials, when the subjects were performing signifi­
cantly better than chance, the Dempster-Shafer and Mycin systems per­
formed better than the Bayes systems (95%, 93%, and 85% correct respec­
tively), E(2,34) = 5.75, p_ < .007. 
The evidence indicates that the subjects were better at translating their 
experience into certainty factors than into Bayesian probabilities. As the 
subjects became more expert, they became better at estimating the 
Dempster-Shafer parameters. 
The second comparison method tested how well the expert systems de­
rived from the subjects' final phase estimates would do on the same task used 
to train the subjects. Given a shape, the systems repeatedly guessed the color 
of blocks until correct. The number of guesses required for each block was 
tabulated. All systems performed significantly better than chance; however, 
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as with the reversals, the Bayesian systems performed slightly worse than the 
Mycin or Dempster-Shafer systems, E(2,34) = 5.57, 9. < .01 
While the above results support most previous system development de­
signs, they all involve the use of only one piece of evidence to make a deci­
sion. The third comparator differs from the previous two in that the expert 
systems are asked to aggregate multiple pieces of evidence to arrive at a de­
cision. This aspect of performance is certainly important to anyone consider­
ing applications of the three uncertainty methodologies. In this scenario, the 
systems derived from the subjects' final phase estimates diagnose the color of 
a bag of blocks (all the same color) based on a sample of shapes from that 
bag. Each shape in the sample may be conceived of as an additional piece of 
evidence. Samples of size 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 10, 20, 40, and 80 were used. 
As the sample size grew, the accuracy of the Bayesian systems increased 
at a faster rate than the accuracy of either of the other two system groups 
(see Figure 1). While absolute differences in accuracy grew with sample size, 
they were nonetheless small- the first to reach statistical significance at the 
0.05 level was that between the Bayesian and Mycin groups using a sample 
size of 40 blocks. 
(I) 
Q) 
(I) 
(I) 
Q) 
::J 
CJ 
2.BB 
1. 75 
1.5B 
1.25 
' D-S 
��; .... / 
',, .... "' 
... ' Mycin ....  K - .._. .. - - � - ,.... 
""'-�· .... "' 
'·:;:::.--------·-" .. _ ... 
-
Bayes 
2 3 4 5 7 1 B 2B 4B 8B 
Blocks per trial 
Figure 1: Average number of guesses per trial broken down by expert 
system group. 
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As an aside, the Mycin aggregation system appeared to reach asymptotic 
performance at or about a sample size of five in this task. We cannot offer 
an explanation for this behavior but observe that it runs contrary to the in­
tuition that more information should lead to improved accuracy. 
One interpretation of our experimental results is that psychologically, 
the correct choice for an uncertainty representation depends on whether the 
system will be asked to aggregate large collections of evidence or just a few 
pieces. For large collections, the classical Bayesian approach appears to have 
an advantage at least over the Mycin system. For small collections, Mycin's 
certainty factors have an advantage over the Bayesian. The Dempster­
Shafer approach appears to do well in both cases. 
The results presented here can, by no means, be considered conclusive. 
The differences, while real, are not vast. In some ways, this lack of a differ­
ence is a significant result in the context of Buchanan and Shortliffe's (1984) 
accepted the conclusion that classical Bayesian parameters cannot be accu­
rately obtained from human experts. 
Some factors of this experiment lead to caution in interpreting the re­
sults. In particular, we must ask whether in the highly synthetic shape-color 
problem, people can be expected to acquire and wield judgments of uncer­
tainty that are both qualitatively and quantitatively similar to those ac­
quired over a lifetime of, for example, medical diagnosis. Nonetheless, the 
differences we have observed lead us to believe that it is worthwhile to be 
aware of the "human in the loop" and to continue to pursue better ways of 
acquiring human estimates of uncertainty. 
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